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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS: 
The Right to a Fair Cross-Section of the  
Community and the Black Box of Jury Pool 
Selection in Arkansas 
A Washington County, Arkansas court conducted a hearing 
on October 15, 2018 on a criminal defendant’s motion to compel 
discovery to assure a fair and accurate cross-section of the 
community for the jury as guaranteed by the United States and 
Arkansas Constitutions.1At the hearing, the jury coordinator for 
the Circuit Clerk’s office testified that counties may elect to use 
a state-sponsored jury selection computer program, or they may 
use proprietary programs.2  Washington County uses a 
proprietary computer program to select the jury pool from a list 
of registered voters.3  The clerk described how her office takes 
an extra step to follow up with property owners, thus making 
them more likely to be summoned for jury duty.4  When 
discussing individuals who cannot afford phone service or who 
do not have voice mail, she stated, “You can’t talk to them.  So I 
1. Order Denying Deft.’s Mot. To Compel Discovery to Assure a Fair & Accurate
Cross Section of the Cmty. For the Jury, Arkansas v. Jenner, No. 72 CR-17-3297 (Oct. 23, 
2018); see also U.S. CONST., amend. VI, XIV.  ARK. CONST. art. II, §§ 8, 10; see also 
Amend. Mot. To Compel Discovery to Assure a Fair & Accurate Cross Section of the 
Cmty. for the Jury at 1, Arkansas v. Jenner, (No. CR 17-3297). 
2. Arkansas v. Jenner, No. 72 CR-17-3297, Trial Tr. (Oct. 15 2018) Pg. 32-33. Most
Arkansas counties use ACS/Xerox Juror for Windows, an obsolete automated jury 
selection and management system implemented in 2002.  See Tim Holthoff, et. al., The 
Path to Change:  AgileCourt and AgileJury? 2016 ACAP Systems Conference (July 2016), 
https://www.arcourts.gov/sites/default/files/2016%20ACAP%20Systems%20Conference%
20-%20Closing%20Session.pdf [https://perma.cc/7EV9-SLXL]; cf. Racial and Ethnic 
Disparities in Alameda County Jury Pools, ACLU OF N.CAL.at 2 (Oct. 2010), 
https://www.aclunc.org/sites/default/files/racial_and_ethnic_disparities_in_alameda_count
y_jury_pools.pdf  https://perma.cc/UGT3-GJBA 
 (noting that as of 2010 only four California counties continued to use the ACS/Xerox Juror 
for Windows program). 
3. Arkansas v. Jenner, No. 72 CR-17-3297, Trial Tr. (Oct. 15 2018) Pg. 31, 34.
4. Id. at 38–39; see also id. at 50.  Only 53.3% of housing units in Washington 
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don’t reach that person.”5  She did not know how individuals 
with criminal records are excluded from the pool so that 
individuals with duplicate names – which is common, for 
example, in the Hispanic community – are not excluded.6  When 
asked about her system of calling and leaving messages, she 
stated she does not have a translator because “I’ve never had 
anyone talk to me that I couldn’t understand.”7  Although the 
United States Supreme Court has noted that “without inspection, 
a party almost invariably would be unable to determine whether 
he has a potentially meritorious jury challenge,”8 the 
Washington County judge concluded that the details of the 
process and software used for creating the venire are “not 
discoverable in this case because. . .you have not presented any 
evidence you would find anything.”9 
It is a well-established constitutional jurisprudence that 
juror selection from a fair cross-section of the community is 
“fundamental to the jury trial guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. . . . .” because the jury cannot “guard against the 
exercise of arbitrary power. . . .if the jury pool is made up of 
only special segments of the populace or if large, distinctive 
groups are excluded from the pool.”10  Without access to 
discovery, jury pool selection process in Arkansas counties 
using propriety software is a black-box.  Indeed, the selection 
process in the counties using the state-sponsored ACS/Xerox 
Juror software is nearly as opaque because the Arkansas 
Judiciary has not made public details about how the aging 
5. Arkansas v. Jenner, No. 72 CR-17-3297, Trial Tr. (Oct. 15 2018) Pg. 45.  At the
close of the hearing, the judge suggested that “if people who don’t own property, if they’ll 
just register to vote, they’ll get called.”  Id. at 61. 
6. Id. at 35–37; see also id. at 52; see also People v. Ramirez, 139 P.3d 64, 93–98 
(Cal. 2006) (discussing how defendant’s claim that the methods of eliminating duplicate 
names from the jury pool caused a disproportionate number of Hispanics being eliminated 
were rendered moot after Los Angeles County adopted defendant’s suggested changes to 
the selection process).  
7. Arkansas v. Jenner, No. 72 CR-17-3297, Trial Tr. (Oct. 15 2018) Pg. 46.  17.4%
of the Washington County population above 5 years old speaks a language other than 
English at home.  QuickFacts, Washington County, Arkansas. 
8. Test v. United States, 420 U.S. 28, 30 (1975).
9. Arkansas v. Jenner, No. 72 CR-17-3297, Trial Tr. (Oct. 15 2018) Pg. 62; see
Order Denying Deft’s Mot. To Compel, at 1. 
10. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
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commercial software selects the jury pool.11  As the Washington 
County hearing illustrates, the fair cross-section right can be 
extremely vexing to enforce because the courts that oversee the 
jury selection process are themselves the gatekeepers to its 
inspection.12  Without discovery into the selection process, the 
results only become visible when the venire is gathered in the 
courtroom for voir dire.13  However, at this point, it is too late to 
enforce the fair-cross section right because the Sixth 
Amendment guarantees only that the petit jury will be selected 
from a fair cross-section of the community, not that a jury 
represents a fair cross-section of the community.14 
The Arkansas Supreme Court may have recently changed 
this in a November 2018 decision, Reams v. State, when it 
wrote, “we hold that a twelve-member jury is meant to include 
twelve members who represent a fair cross-section of the 
community.”15  The holding was made within the context of a 
Rule 37 post-conviction appeal of a three-day 1993 capital 
murder trial that has been winding its way through Arkansas 
courts since 1997.16  The defendant’s post-conviction petition 
raised fourteen claims.17  Of interest to this note is the Court’s 
handling of his argument that his fair-cross-section claim.  
11. The Florida Judiciary is transparent about how a jury pool is selected in each
Florida county and has published descriptions of how the AOC/Xerox Juror for Windows 
software functions.  See Attachment “A,” Method of Jury Selection for Collier County, In 
Re Juror Selection Plan: Collier Cty, Admin. Order No. AOSC07-48 (Fla. 2007).  See also 
Attachment A – Agile Jury.  Random Pool Selection Overview, In re: Juror Selection Plan: 
Pasco County, Admin. Order No. A0SC16-66 (Fla. 2016) (describing how a successor 
software program several generations beyond ACS/Xerox Juror selects the jury pool). 
12. See Nina W. Chernoff, No Records, No Right: Discovery & the Fair Cross-
Section Guarantee, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1719, 1725 (2016). 
There is a growing awareness within academic literature of  how computer algorithms may 
lead to discriminatory, erroneous or otherwise problematic results.  Robert Brauneis & 
Ellen P. Goodman, 20 YJLT 103, at 107-08 & nn. 6–9 (2018).  However, the Arkansas 
Supreme Court seems to place blind trust in such programs for jury selection.  See, e.g., 
Davis v. State, 925 S.W.3d 402, 404 (Ark. 1996) (“We have also recognized that where the 
venire is chosen by computer, using the random selection process mandated by § 16–32–
103, there is no possibility of a purposeful exclusion of African–Americans.”). 
13. Chernoff, supra note 12 at 1725.
14. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 173 (1986) (“We have never invoked the
fair-cross-section principle. . . to require petit juries, as opposed to jury panels or venires, to 
reflect the composition of the community at large.). 
15. 2018 Ark. 324 at 19, 560 S.W. 3d 441, 454.
16. Id. at 2, 560 S.W.3d at 445. 
17. Id. at 2, 560 S.W.3d at 445.
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Reams argued that “he was tried, convicted, and sentenced to 
death by a predominantly Caucasian jury that was drawn from a 
mostly Caucasian jury pool and did not come close to reflecting 
a fair cross-section of the . . . community.” He asserts this claim 
was cognizable under Duren v. Missouri18 as an independent 
claim under Rule 37 because it was structural in nature.19  Thus, 
he argued, the circuit court made a clear error when it ruled that 
under Rule 37 the claim was cognizable only as ineffective 
assistance of counsel.20  Ream’s interest in the Court’s 
recognition of the fair-cross-section claim as independent is 
because independent claims (in contrast to ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims) do not have to show actual prejudice.21 
In analyzing whether a fair-cross-section claim is structural 
under Rule 37, the Court seemed to anchor its holding in both 
the United States and Arkansas Constitutions.  Before holding 
that a petit jury is meant to represent a cross-section of the 
community, it reaffirmed its prior holdings on the right to a jury 
trial, explaining that: 
[t]he right to a jury in a criminal case is a fundamental right
of our jurisprudence and is cognized by the Magna Charta [sic.], 
the Declaration of Independence, the federal constitution, and 
our state constitution. 
Based on our discussion above, the law is clear: the right to 
a jury trial is part of the basic structure of our courts. Here, in 
addressing Reams’s [sic.] argument regarding the composition 
of his jury, we hold that a twelve-member jury is meant to 
include twelve members who represent a fair cross-section of the 
community.22 
18. Id. at 14-15, 560 S.W. 3d at 451. He also argued that his claim was cognizable
under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), but the Court rejected this as inappropriate 
for post-conviction in this case because they were raised on direct appeal. Reams, 2018 
Ark. 324, at 13-14, 560 S.W.3d at 451. 
19. Reams, 2018 Ark. 324 at 14, 560 S.W. 3d at 451.
20. Id.
21. Reams also claimed that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to
failure to raise “the fair-cross-section-of-the-jury violation based on the systematic 
underrepresentation of African American potential jurors. False” and that the circuit court 
erred in its finding that he did not show prejudice under the second prong of Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  The Court held that “the prejudice prong of Strickland 
is demonstrated through the existence of a fair-cross-section violation.”  Reams v. State, 
2018 Ark. 324 at 13, 560 S.W.3d 441, 451. 
22. Reams, 2018 Ark. 324 at 19, 560 S.W. 3d at 454 (citations omitted).
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But did the Arkansas Supreme Court intend to expand the 
fair-cross section right to the petit jury when other courts have 
noted that it is unworkable?  The United States Supreme Court 
has noted the difficulty in applying the fair cross-section to the 
petit jury when overturning an Eight Circuit decision that 
applied the Sixth Amendment to the twelve-person jury.23  The 
structure of the Reams opinion suggests that the Court may have 
intended the expansion.  The Arkansas Supreme Court 
acknowledged that its decision may burden the system, quoting 
its landmark decision to expand a criminal jury to twelve 
members from six: 
In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that this 
extension is supported by our case law. As we explained in 
Grinning, “We are well aware of the view expressed by the state 
that some abuse of the criminal justice system could result from 
our construction of the Arkansas Constitution and the Arkansas 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. However . . . this may be the price 
the judicial system must pay to ensure that a defendant is not 
deprived of his fundamental constitutional right to a trial by 
jury.”24 
The reference to Grinning also seems to indicate that the 
Court is tethering the expansion of the fair cross-section of the 
petit jury to the Arkansas Constitution, something that would be 
necessary for an expansion of the right since, as noted above, the 
United States Supreme Court has been clear that the Sixth 
Amendment applies only to the venire.25 
However, the instructions on the remand suggest that the 
Reams Court perhaps did not intend to expand the right.  The 
Reams Court remanded the case for further findings as to 
whether Reams has shown a valid fair-cross-section violation 
under the three-prong Duren v. Missouri test  “using the three-
prong test set forth above.”26  The Court had previously 
described the elements of the Duren test as: 
(1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a ‘distinctive’
group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group 
in venires from which juries are selected is not fair and 
23. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 174 (1986).
24. Reams, 2018 Ark. 324 at 19, 560 S.W. 3d at 454 (citations omitted).
25. See, e.g., Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 174.
26. Reams, 2018 Ark. 324 at 22, 560 S.W. 3d at 455 (citations omitted).
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reasonable in relation to the number of such persons in the 
community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to 
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.27 
If the Court really intended to hold that a twelve-member 
jury is meant to include twelve members who represent a fair 
cross-section of the community it seems that a Duren analysis of 
the venire would not use the three-prong test as stated, but rather 
the second Duren prong would need to be modified to show that 
the representation of the group on the petit jury is not fair and 
reasonable in relations to the number of such persons in the 
community.  Otherwise, Duren is testing is for a fair cross-
section on the venire, not the petit jury as Reams explicitly 
stated. 
After deciding that, as a matter of law, a fair-cross section 
structural claim was cognizable in a Rule 37 petition, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court remanded the case for “further 
findings as to whether Reams ha[d] established a valid Duren 
claim.”28  The Court did not discuss any evidence of violation 
presented during the eighteen-year course of Reams’ Rule 37 
evidentiary hearings.29  This indicates that a threshold showing 
is not required before allowing inquiry into a fair-cross section 
violation claim in Arkansas.  Whatever the Court intended with 
regard to possible expansion of the fair-cross section right to the 
petit jury, it is implicit in the Court’s remand that the selection 
process of Reams’ venire is discoverable. 
RAELYNN J HILLHOUSE 
27. Id. 18, 560 S.W. 3d at 453.
28. Id. at 22, 560 S.W. 3d at 455.
29. The Court limited its discussion of the fair-cross section evidence to a description
in its procedural history summary.  See id. at 4, 560 S.W. 3d at 446.  The hearing began on 
August 20, 2007 and concluded on January 5, 2015.   
 Ph.D. University of Michigan; J.D. expected 2019.  I am grateful to Tiffany Murphy and 
Matt Bender for their insightful comments.
